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INTRODUCTION

In its responsive briefing, the State sets forth four arguments in opposition to Mr.
Downing's appeal. Each argument fails, however, and Mr. Downing's appeal is appropriately
granted.
First, the State argues that the District Court correctly expanded the applicability of
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to third parties swept up in warrantless probation

searches. The State's argument fails because Summers is limited to those subject to warrantbased searches, and the cases applying its rationale to third parties swept up in warrantless
probation searches did so under highly limited and distinguishable factual circumstances.
Second, the State argues that Officer Holtry' s frisk of Mr. Downing was justified on
officer safety grounds, but the situation was well and truly under control and presented no safety
concerns when Officer Holtry frisked Mr. Downing.
Third, the State argues that the District Court's factual finding that Mr. Downing
consented to Officer Holtry's search of his pocket was not clearly erroneous, but the weight of
the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Downing did not so consent.
Lastly, the State argues that, assuming arguendo that all three searches were illegal, the
inevitable discovery doctrine inoculates the frisk of Mr. Downing. Such application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine, however, stretches it past its breaking point and is not justified
under these factual circumstances.

It should also be noted that after the probation officers unlawfully detained Mr. Downing,
every subsequent search or questioning of Mr. Downing by law enforcement is appropriately
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
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ARGUMENT

A.

Michigan v. Summers is Inapplicable.

The State first argues that the District Court correctly expanded the applicability of
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to third parties swept up in warrantless probation

searches. (Brief of Respondent ("Resp. Br."), 6-14.)
As a threshold matter, the State recognizes that Summers is limited in its applicability
because it ruled only that the owner of a home subject to a search warrant may be lawfully
detained during the pendancy of such warrant-based search. (Resp. Br., 7-8.)
The State argues, however, based on People v. Matelski, a California Court of Appeals
case, that the applicability of Summers should be expanded to justify the detention of those in the
position of Mr. Downing, namely third parties swept up in a warrantless probation search of a
premises. (Resp. Br., 9-10.) Matelski, however, to the extent the Court finds it persuasive, is
readily distinguishable from the facts of this case and does not support the State's argument for
expansion of Summers.
In Matelski, officers went to the home of a probationer, Michael Mitchell, to conduct a
warrantless probation search. 82 Cal. App. 4th 837, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The search was
conducted specifically because Mr. Mitchell "flunked a drug test." Id. at 851, 853. At the door,
the officers noticed Matelski leaving the home. Id. The officers told Matelski to "come over
here" and promptly explained that the conditions of Mr. Mitchell's probation "prevented him
from associating with persons who were convicted felons." Id. The officers then asked for
identifying information to determine "if they were convicted felons." Id. at 841-42. Matelski had
an outstanding warrant and was arrested. Id. at 842.
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Matelski moved to suppress, arguing that he was not engaged in any criminal activity
when he was detained. Id. Significantly, the state did not argue that Matelski was subject to
detention simply because he was present at the location where the warrantless probation search
occurred; rather, the state argued that "it was reasonable to detain defendants to determine if they
were convicted felons because, if they were, the parolee would have been in violation of his
parole conditions in associating with them." Id. Thus, Matelski was detained for the specific,
articulated reason of determining if his mere presence constituted a parole violation on the part
of the party subject to the warrantless probation search.
As the State does in this case, the state in Matelski based its argument on Summers.
Differentiating Summers, the Matelski court noted that a "significant factor in evaluating the
character of the intrusion is that it was pursuant to a search warrant, i.e., a neutral magistrate had
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in the house."

Id. at 847. The Matelski court, appropriately following Summers' limited holding, ruled that "a
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Id. at 848.
The Matelski court, recognizing that the applicability of Summers did not extend to third
parties swept up in warrantless probation searches, relied on two California state cases, People v.

Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th 354 (Cal. 1995), and People v. Hannah, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1335 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996), to articulate the test applicable in such circumstances:
We balance the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it,
looking in the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and
objective facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular
detention.

Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
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The Matelski court concluded that the detention was brief, no more than "15 minutes,"
and not public Id. at 850. Of great significance was the fact that the detention served
individualized and articulated government interests: "there was a need to determine defendants'
connection to the probation because the probationer was prohibited by his general terms of
probation from consorting with convicted felons." Id. Elaborating, the court noted that
"[a]lthough there was some intrusion on the privacy interests of the Matelskis as a result of the
probation search here, we find that such intrusion was minimal and not unreasonable in the light
of the officer's duty to ascertain if Mr. Mitchell was violating the terms of his probation." Id. at
853.
The State reads Matelski far too broadly in arguing that the "Matelski Court agreed that

Summers would apply to probation searches." (Resp. Br., 9.) Matelski reaches no such broad
conclusion. Rather, Matelski weighed the invasion of privacy of the third party against the
articulated government interest of determining whether the third party's mere presence
constituted a violation of the probationer's terms.
The facts of this case clearly indicate that, unlike Matelski, there existed no articulated,
individualized reason to detain Mr. Downing. The record is wholly devoid of any indication that
Mr. Downing's status, whether as a felon or otherwise, was investigated and relevant to the terms
of Mr. Cook's probation. Rather, the officers in this case detained Mr. Downing solely for the
reason that he happened to be located on the premises of a home subject to a random, warrantless
probation search. Such non-existent basis for detention clearly fails to satisfy the governmental
interest requirement set forth in Matelski.
Furthermore, a recent California case interpreting Matelski bolsters Mr. Downing's
position. In People v. Morrison, 2014 WL 4249930 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), probation officers
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conducted a random probation compliance search of a probationer's home. Id. at * 1. Morrison
was exiting the home with the probationer and was detained as part of the search. Id. Morrison
informed the officers that heroin found in the house was hers, and later moved to suppress on
unlawful detention grounds. Id.
The Morrison court granted the suppression motion, ruling the detention unlawful. Id. at
*6. Of great significance was the fact that, unlike the search in Matelski, the search was purely
random; it was not the result of an articulable suspicion of a probation violation:
Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers, in conducting a "probation
compliance search," were acting on facts that might give rise to a suspicion that Stugard
was in violation of probation. Insofar as the record reveals, the police, in the language
utilized in Matelski, were "acting randomly."

Id. at *5.
In this case, as in Morrison, the record evidence demonstrates that the search of Mr.
Cook's home was purely random, a routine probation compliance check. There is no evidence
that the probation officers in this case were, as in Matelski, checking on Mr. Cook for a specific
reason such as a failed drug test. Indeed, the "purpose of the visit was a resident verification", a
strikingly benign purpose. (Tr., p. 59, L. 21-22; p. 43, L. 16-18.) That Mr. Downing was detained
incident to a purely random probation compliance search further undermines the State's reliance
on Matelski 's rationale to extend Summers.
The State may attempt to pivot and argue that two other government interests justified
Mr. Downing's detention as part of a random home verification visit. First, the State may argue
that even if the purpose of the visit to Mr. Cook's residence was a random home verification
visit, the officers discovered criminal activity afoot justifying Mr. Downing's detention. The
facts, however, fatally undermine such argument. Officer Hurst had Mr. Cook sit on the couch
immediately upon entering Mr. Cook's home. (Tr., p. 44, L. 11-15.) Though Mr. Cook began
5

acting erratically at some point in time, any number of reasons could have caused Mr. Cook to so
behave, and there is no indication in the record of Mr. Downing acting erratically, or even
uncooperatively, at any juncture. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Mr. Downing was denied
permission to leave the residence by Officer Hurst before any paraphernalia was located. (Tr., p.
11, L. 3-p. 12, L. 12.) Thus, when Mr. Downing was denied permission to leave Mr. Cook's
residence, there was zero articulable, individualized suspicion with regards to any criminal
conduct on the part of Mr. Downing.
Second, the State may argue the Mr. Downing's detention was justified solely on officer
safety grounds, but this argument likewise has no merit. The record demonstrates that Mr.
Downing was supremely cooperative with the probation officers, allowing them entry to the
house. (Tr., p. 44, L. 16-19.) When the probation officers entered the residence Mr. Cook greeted
them and was likewise cooperative: "Mr. Cook was actually behind the couch, and he popped up
and, said, hi, so we had him come and sit down." (Tr., p. 44, L. 13-15.) At some point in time
Mr. Cook became agitated, but he was easily restrained with handcuffs and he obeyed commands
to sit, quickly mooting safety concerns:
Q:

What was Mr. Cook doing when you placed him in restraints?

A:

He was, I believe, sitting on a chair, rocking back and forth and looked nervous
and a little agitated.

(Tr., p. 46, L. 5-8.) It was at this point in time, with Mr. Cook restrained and at most "nervous"
and a "little agitated," that Mr. Downing stood up and requested to leave, which permission was
denied by the probation officers. (Tr., p. 11, L. 1-11.) At the time the probation officers denied
Mr. Downing permission to leave, the record demonstrates zero officer safety concerns justifying
Mr. Downing's continued detention.
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In summary, Idaho law has not extended Summers in the manner applied by the District
Court, and the Court should decline the State's invitation to do so. To the extent the Court places
persuasive weight on Matelski, that case does not stand for the blanket proposition that any third
party who happens to be present during a warrantless probation search may be detained. Rather,

Matelski requires a case by case balancing of the invasion of a third party's privacy against the
government's interest at issue. In this case, Mr. Downing's privacy was arbitrarily and
capriciously invaded, and such invasion furthered no government interest. The search of Mr.
Cook's house was wholly random and not based on any individualized, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. The government made no inquiry as to whether Mr. Downing's mere presence
was a violation of Mr. Cook's probation as was the case in Matelski. At the time the probation
officers denied Mr. Downing permission to leave, there was no suspicion of criminal activity on
the part of Mr. Downing, nor were there reasonable officer safety concerns.

B.

No Officer Safety Concerns Justified Officer Holtry's Frisk of Mr. Downing.

The State argues that the District Court correctly found that officer safety concerns
justified Officer Holtry's frisk of Mr. Downing. (Resp. Br., 14-18.) The factual circumstances,
however, did not present officer safety concerns justifying Officer Holtry's frisk of Mr.
Downing.
The State emphasizes that when Officer Holtry arrived on the scene, the probationer Mr.
Cook was "curled up into a little fetal position" and was "sobbing and pretty emotional." (Resp.

Br., 16; Tr., p. 27, L. 6-10.) The State, however, ignores the highly critical and undisputed fact
that Mr. Cook was handcuffed. (Tr., p. 27, L. 6.) Indeed, probation officer Hurst described Mr.
Cook as only being "nervous and a little agitated" after he was placed in handcuffs. (Tr., p. 46, L.
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7-8.) It is patently umeasonable that Mr. Cook, in handcuffs, agitated, and a bit nervous, posed a
safety threat to Officer Holtry and justified a search of Mr. Downing.
Nor is there a shred of evidence in the record that either Mr. Downing or the third
occupant of the house posed a safety risk. Probation officers Hurst and Severson undoubtedly
would have restrained either Mr. Downing or the other occupant had they believed their safety
was threatened. Indeed, the record demonstrates that both men were cooperative at every tum,
sitting on the couch as directed and obeying commands not to leave Mr. Cook's residence. There
is no record evidence that Mr. Downing or the other man acted in a threatening manner at any
juncture. As the State's trial counsel summarized, "Mr. Downing was exceptionally cooperative
during this entire contact. He consented to the officers coming into that house. He consented to
sitting on the couch." (Tr., p. 51, L. 14-17.)
If the frisk of Mr. Downing under these circumstances was reasonable in light of officer

safety concerns, it is difficult to imagine any frisk being deemed umeasonable. Any prohibition
against officer safety frisks would be rendered an effective nullity. It also bears repeating that the
frisk occurred after Mr. Downing was unlawfully detained, thereby rendering the frisk, legal or
not, properly suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
C.

Officer Holtry Removed the Package from Mr. Downing's Pocket Without
Consent.

The State argues that the District Court's factual finding that Mr. Downing consented to
the removal of the package from his pocket by Officer Holtry was not clearly erroneous. (Resp.

Br., 18-20.) The State cites Officer Holtry's testimony with no further corroboration, and then
dismisses Mr. Downing's argument because he only "point[s] to Downing's contrary testimony
that Officer Holtry began pulling the object out before Downing consented to the search." (Resp.
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Br., 20.) Mr. Downing testified that Officer Holtry had already reached in his pocket before Mr.
Downing consented to the search. (Tr., p. 16, L. 13-p.17, L. 9.)
The State's argument fails for two reasons. First, Officer Holtry's version of events is
wholly uncorroborated, and Mr. Downing's version of events is likelier in light of Officer
Holtry's testimony. Officer Holtry testified that, based on his external manipulation of the item
in Mr. Downing's pocket, he suspected it was methamphetamine. (Tr,. p. 38, L. 3-18.) It is
reasonable to presume that Officer Holtry, suspecting the nature of the substance, reached into
Mr. Downing's pocket to retrieve the object prior to receiving permission to do so, even if he
was asking for such permission simultaneously. Furthermore, Officer Holtry expressed that he
had safety concerns at this juncture, giving him more reason, in his mind, to prematurely remove
the item from Mr. Downing's pocket.
Secondly, and most significantly, Officer Holtry's removal of the object from Mr.
Downing's pocket occurred after Mr. Downing was unlawfully detained, thereby rendering the
search, legal consented to or not, properly suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
D.

The Inevitable Discovery Rule does not Inoculate the Prior Unlawful Searches.

The State's final argument is that the inevitable discovery rule renders the entirety of the
unlawful searches and questioning of Mr. Downing in this case moot because Mr. Downing was
arrested for frequenting, and the methamphetamine on his person would have been discovered
pursuant to a lawful search incident to his frequenting arrest. (Resp. Br., 21-22.)
The State, however, strains the inevitable discovery rule into fantastic hindsight and well
beyond its breaking point. It is well-established that the exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy
for addressing illegal searches and bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to the
illegal search. See Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284 (2001). An exception
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to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. The inevitable discovery doctrine
applies when a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the information would have
inevitably been discovered by lawful methods. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984); State
v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,286 n. 4, 108 P.3d 424,433 n. 4 (Ct. App. 2005).

The State contends that because Mr. Downing, after being read his Miranda rights,
admitted to Officer Holtry that he had used illegal substances in Mr. Cook's house that day, Mr.
Downing's arrest and search incident thereto were inevitable. (Resp. Br., 21-22.) This argument,
however, wholly ignores the unlawful nature of Mr. Downing's detention ab initio. Had Mr.
Downing not been unlawfully detained when he attempted to leave Mr. Cook's residence, he
would not have been subjected to questioning by Officer Holtry, Mirandized or otherwise.
The inevitable discovery rule cannot presume away the initial unlawful detention of Mr.
Downing by the probation officers. "The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery
doctrine is that a preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took place,
or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the discovery of the evidence that was
already obtained through unlawful police action." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 916, 136 P.3d
379, 387 (Ct. App. 2006).
Stated differently, the fruit of an unlawful search is only saved by the inevitable
discovery rule if the evidence demonstrates that some lawful action took place which would have
led to the discovery of the evidence in question. The inevitable discovery doctrine was not
intended to allow a court to consider what actions the authorities should or could have taken and
in doing so then determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully obtained evidence would
have been inevitable. See United States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2000); State v.
Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392, 707 P.2d 493, 503 (1985).
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The State is asking the Court to ignore an unlawful detention and presume a lawful
detention which did not exist. In this case there was no simultaneous, independently lawful
detention of Mr. Downing pursuant to which Officer Holtry questioned Mr. Downing. Officer
Holtry was able to question Mr. Downing only because Mr. Downing was unlawfully detained.
The State cannot conjure a hypothetical in which Mr. Downing was lawfully detained for some
other reason and then deem discovery inevitable.
Indeed, in Holman, the state argued an officer's unlawful seizure of a vehicle did not taint
the evidence of the vehicle's identification. The state reasoned that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applied because the police could have seized the truck lawfully and, had they done so,
the identification of the truck would have been inevitable. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed
this argument, stating the inevitable discovery doctrine was never intended to swallow the
exclusionary rule wholly by substituting what the police should have done for what they really
did. Holman, 109 Idaho at 392, 707 P.2d at 503.
The State advances precisely this rejected argument, taking the position that Mr.
Downing could have been searched pursuant to a lawful detention, when in actuality Mr.
Downing was searched only because he was unlawfully detained. As much as it might desire to
do so, the State cannot change the facts to its liking ex post. The State's inevitable discovery
argument is unavailing and appropriately rejected.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Downing's appeal is appropriately granted and the case
remanded.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of June, 2017.

MATTHEW G. GUNN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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